


ENTRACTE & CECILIA
Joint Climate Policy Workshop
12 September 2013, Dublin

Current state and conceivable futures of EU ETS

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


The evaluation of EU ETS in the paper by Christian de Perthuis and Raphael Trotignon (2013)

- **Reasons for the current market situation** are economic conditions, policy overlap, Kyoto credits
- **Structural issues** will not be resolved by “backloading” or “set aside”
- **Changing the reduction target** is necessary but not sufficient
- **Governance could be improved** by independent carbon authority



**I want to underline this evaluation by
contributing some additional arguments and
suggesting a broader policy perspective
for EU ETS**




**More facts than just the carbon price
need to be considered**

The overlooked fragmentation of the market




Highly unequal size distribution of installations

85 % installations account for only 10 % emissions





Power sector dominates Accounts for 73 % of emissions



Fragmentation of stringency between Power and NonPower sectors

- Power sector was rather short
- NonPower sector was always long
- Differences between trading periods





Profile of country stringencies 2008 - 2012

EU ETS Net Positions
All sectors 2008-2012

■ The overall market was long by about 5 %

■ Country positions differ





**The economic foundations of EU ETS
have turned out to be only limited operational**

**Uncertainty about abatement costs
and impacts on technologies undermine the
cost minimization argument**



Problem 1

Abatement costs are not a well defined concept

Abatement options	Operating decisions no investments	Investment decisions different levels of investments
Change of output		
Change of energy efficiency		
Change of energy mix		

- This is caused inter alia by the difference between **integrated and add-on** abatement technologies




Problem 2

The causality from the stringency of allowances to technical change is highly uncertain



- Carbon prices of a conceivable size have only a very limited impact on the choice of technologies



Steps to a structural reform of EU ETS

More than backloading and tightening




(1)

**A long-term target path (up to 2050?)
instead of fixed caps with fixed trading periods**

This will create confidence for investors



A long-term target path




(2)

**A flexible supply mechanism
that maintains the intended stringency
of the target path**

**This will decouple the stringency of supply
from fluctuations of economic activity**



Supply compensation for maintaining target stringency



Actual supply of allowances in the current year compensates the discrepancy between target supply and actual emissions of the previous year.

(3)

**Emissions or emissions intensities
can be used as base for the target path**

**Intensities will reduce the vulnerability of the
market with respect to output fluctuations**



Reasons for switching to an emissions intensity target

- An emissions intensity target encompasses both an
 - energy efficiency target and a
 - carbon share target
- An emissions intensity target can be considered as a substitute for the current three EU 2020 targets

C carbon emissions
E energy used
Q GDP
I emissions intensity

$$I \equiv C / Q$$

emissions intensity energy efficiency carbon share

$$[C / Q] \equiv [E / Q] \cdot [C / E]$$



(4)

**Recycling of auctioning revenues for
stimulating technical innovation**

**This can be done via a technology fund for
targeted technology policies**



(5)

Eliminating small emitters

**85 percent of the installations account for
only 10 percent of total emissions**




(6)

An independent carbon market authority

**For maintaining the stringency of the target path,
monitoring and verification of emissions**





Time for a Plan B?

**Imbedding energy and climate policy into
innovation-driven industrial policy**



Wegener Center



Facing the current state of the EU

- The ongoing financial, economic and sovereign debt crisis
- The loss of competitiveness
- Industry's widening technology gap



EU's industry is loosing ground in the global technology competition


National Science Board (2012): Science and Engineering Indicators



The technology gap of EU vs. US and China is widening

Innovation - the key to industrial policy

- **McKinsey Global Institute (2012).**
Manufacturing the future. The next era of global growth and innovation.
- **Robert D. Atkinson and Steven J. Ezell (2012).**
Innovation economics: the race for global advantage.
- **Julian Allwood (2012).**
Sustainable materials. With both eyes open.



A Copernican turn for EU energy and climate policy


- Embedding EU ETS into a targeted technology package
- A structural reform as far as allowed by a political consensus
- But the main impact on emissions reductions is expected from stimulating break-through technologies



Focus on break-through technologies (1)

Incentives for innovative processes and products

- CEPI 2050 Roadmap to a low-carbon bio-economy
- Additive manufacturing (3D printing)



Focus on break-through technologies (2)

Incentives for innovative business models

David Crane - CEO of NRG Energy, the biggest power provider to US utilities,
at the MIT Energy Conference 2013

“Consumers are realizing they don’t need the power industry at all”

- **NRG started investment programs for homes and businesses**

- **Mini and micro generation systems**
 - **PV panels**
 - **Micro cogeneration based on natural gas**



Focus on break-through technologies (3)

Incentives for innovative financing



- Targeted project financing by EIB and EBRD
- Re-financing of business banks by ECB linked to targeted projects of the real sector

Thank you.

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